

The perception of inequality of opportunity in Europe

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Abstract

Does the way scholars measure inequality of opportunity correspond to how people perceive it? What other factors influence individual perception of this phenomenon? To answer these questions we must first clarify how scholars define and measure inequality of opportunity. We discuss the possible mechanisms linking objective measures to subjective perception of the phenomenon, then propose a measure of perceived inequality of opportunity, and finally test our hypothesis by merging data coming from two sources: the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (2011) and the International Social Survey Programme (2009). We suggest that the prevailing perception of the degree of unequal opportunity in a large sample of respondents is only weakly correlated with its objective measure. We estimate a multilevel model considering both individual and country level controls to explain individual perception of unequal opportunity. Our estimates suggest that the two most adopted measures of inequality of opportunity have not clear role in explaining its perception. Conversely, other country level variables and personal experiences of intergenerational social mobility are important determinants of how inequality of opportunity is perceived.

Keywords: Inequality of opportunity, inequality perception, intergenerational mobility, attribution theory.

JEL: D63, A14, D31.

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1 Introduction

Equality of opportunity is an increasingly considered topic in economics. In 2015 both the Handbook of Income Distribution (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015) and the Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy (Adler and Fleurbaey, 2015) devote multiple chapters to different aspects of equal opportunity. The way economists understand and measure inequality of opportunity today is rooted in a debate involving political philosophers and theoretical economists about the egalitarian paradigm. Since the seminal contributions by Rawls in the early '70s, a number of authors have attempted to revise the egalitarian paradigm proposing alternative spaces in which equity should be implemented. Dworkin (1981a, b) suggested that the object of equalization should be individual resource endowment rather than achievements. Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) explicitly introduced the idea of responsibility as a source of ethically inoffensive inequality. For all of these authors, society should remove inequality arising from factors that influence individual's outcome for which she cannot be held responsible (Ferreira and Peragine, 2015). Roemer (1998) proposed a definition of equal opportunity in which individuals exerting the same effort are entitled to obtain the same outcome, and any inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control should be removed. More recently Fleurbaey (2008) introduced a framework in which preferences participate together with resources to determine the level of individual welfare. If one agree that individuals should be held responsible for their preferences and choices, then this framework can be used to define and measure equality of opportunity.

The most commonly proposed definitions of equality of opportunity are based on two norms: the principle of compensation, which states that inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control is inequality of opportunity, and the principle of reward, which states that inequality due to choice and effort is not. Different definitions of equality of opportunity originate from the way the two principles are balanced. In the recent years a vast range of definitions of equal opportunity have been proposed, most of them have been translated into measures of inequality of opportunity and employed in a growing empirical literature. However, whether those normative definitions correspond to how people understand and perceive inequality of opportunity remains an unanswered question.

The interest of this question is twofold. On the one hand, individuals are believed to take decisions based on their preferences and constraints. The ability to correctly understand constraints and opportunities is therefore crucial in the process of individual decision-making and welfare maximisation. On the other hand, measures of inequality of opportunity are based on normative principles and a number of assumptions introduced by scholars. Such methodological choices should not be based on public opinion of unequal opportunity. However, as shown by Amiel and Cowell (1992) for the case of inequality, a better understanding of how individuals perceive inequality of opportunity can draw the economist's attention to aspects of inequality traditionally neglected by the literature.

A natural starting point for such an investigation is the literature on the perception of inequality; after all, inequality of opportunity is a particular type of inequality. The importance of the public opinion on the level of inequality in a country is well known; it can influence individual behaviour and social cohesion. Perceived increasing inequality can modify electoral results or even trigger unrest, as it was

suggested for Egypt and other countries involved in the Arab Spring (Verme, 2014).

However, a number of recent empirical contributions in psychology and economics have shown that the perception of inequality reported by people in opinion surveys does not correspond to income inequality as it is commonly measured (Chambers et al., 2014; Cruces et al., 2013; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2015; Norton and Ariely, 2011; Verme, 2013). Other contributions have shown that a society's structure can be perceived to be considerably less equitable than it actually is (Niehues, 2014). Finally, Keller et al. (2010) compare 27 European countries and suggest a stronger correlation between perception of inequality and measures of poverty than for measures of inequality itself.

It is important to note, however, that the preponderance of the economic literature that has investigated this topic has not focused on the factors that explain the perception of inequality. Perceived inequality has, instead, been generally considered to be an exogenous explanatory variable of the citizens attitude toward redistribution. Beside the classical median voter theory, in which the voters attitude is determined solely by their position in the income distribution, the "tunnel effect" theory - described by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) - suggests a role for expectations: inequality in the short run can be positively perceived even by worse off individuals if it is interpreted as a signal of general improvement in the future. Similarly, the "prospect for upward mobility" hypothesis—theoretically investigated by Benabou and Ok (2001) -suggests that, when expecting future upward mobility, even individuals with an income below the median will oppose progressive redistributive policies.

In discussing this mechanism, these contributions have often introduced the idea that the degree of equal opportunity and social mobility is crucial in determining the acceptability of inequality. According to Piketty (1995), this idea dates back to De Tocqueville (1835) who suggested that different rates of social mobility in the United States and Europe could explain the differing attitudes toward redistribution. This point of view is shared by a number of authors that have explained different attitudes toward inequality on the two continents by reference to the difference in popular beliefs about the degree of social mobility (Lipset and Bendix, 1959; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). A similar explanation has been proposed by Whyte (2010) and Lu (2012) in discussing the reaction to growing inequality in China, and also by Gimpelson and Monusova (2014) in relation to a large sample of countries. According to these theories, perceived inequality depends on the difference between what individuals feel entitled to obtain and what they have obtained or expect to obtain in the future.

Again, these contributions have considered the perception of equality of opportunity and social mobility due to exogenous factors and have included them among the variables explaining peoples attitudes toward inequality and redistributive policies. In what follows we endeavor to take a step back and seek instead to explain how the perception of equality of opportunity is formed and, further, to explain the relationship between this perception and the actual degree of equality of opportunity in a given society. Very few sociological contributions have attempted to shed light on how the individual perception of social mobility is formed (Webb, 2000; Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2001). Among economists, only Pasquier-Doumet (2005) makes a contribution that focuses on the perception of inequality of opportunity. Her analysis is based on a rich questionnaire of semi-open questions asked to a sample of 100 individuals in Lima. Unfortunately, her contribution is a descriptive working paper which was never

published but nevertheless contains a number of interesting research starting points.

The simplest possible approach to this problem consists in assuming that the cognitive process of quantifying the relative role of choices and circumstances in determining success in life is close enough to the prevailing methodology followed by economists to measure inequality of opportunity. If this is true, we should expect a strong correlation between measured and perceived inequality of opportunity. Of course, individual perceptions may be imprecise due to the complexity of the phenomenon of inequality of opportunity. In order to formulate an opinion on the degree of inequality of opportunity, one must first ascertain the average effect that choices and circumstances have on outcomes. Then, in order to judge the intensity of the phenomenon, one must compare inequality caused by circumstances beyond individual control in her particular country against some benchmark, for example by making a comparison with the same phenomenon in other countries. Individuals will inevitably make mistakes while undertaking this complicated process of reasoning. However, if the expected value of the error is zero and errors are not correlated within and between individuals, the distribution of perception among a large sample of individuals will be approximately normally distributed around the objective measure of inequality of opportunity.

On the other hand, it must also be acknowledged that individual perceptions may be influenced by other factors and, where this occurs, their aggregation may be less straightforward. A case in point would be a country in which institutional characteristics (for example, its fiscal system) affect public perception. In such cases we will find individuals perception to be downward biased or upward biased depending on the fiscal system in place in their country. Moreover, a plausible hypothesis is that perceptions of the relative importance of exogenous circumstances are shaped by personal experience. Assuming that people can at least identify where they stand in respect to income distribution and their exogenous circumstances, we are left with the problem of understanding how individuals quantify the causal contribution of innate characteristics to this outcome.

The economic literature is silent on this issue, but there is extensive literature in the field of social psychology that considers how individuals explain or attribute causes to outcomes. Since Fritz Heider's seminal contributions, the attribution theory represents the main theoretical framework to explain the processes by which individuals attribute causes to events and behaviours (Weimer, 1974). According to this theory attribution can be internal, if individuals consider that an event is due to individual characteristics such as traits or feelings, or external if individuals consider the any given event occurs as a result of situational factors beyond personal control. According to Weimer, attribution can also be classified by other two causal dimensions: stability and controllability.

In this literature, a number of empirical contributions have shown the presence of bias in the perceptual process, especially when individuals make causal inferences with regard to personal outcomes (Miller and Ross, 1975; Russell, 1982). According to these authors, a self-serving bias operates when individuals formulate attributions about the causes of personal successes and failures, distorting the cognitive process in order to maintain self-esteem. When explaining success individuals tend to emphasise the role of internal causes. Failures, on the other hand, tend to be more often perceived as caused by external and uncontrollable factors. This point is particularly relevant for our analysis. When asked

about the role of circumstances beyond individual control in determining success in life, interviewees may formulate a judgment based on experiences of success and failure familiar to them. In doing so, their own experience may be disproportionately weighted. Therefore, due to this self-esteem bias, we no longer expect the perception of inequality of opportunity to be distributed around its objective measure. On average, individuals who perceive their life as a story of success - because for example they are experiencing upward mobility - will tend to understate the role of external conditions in determining outcomes and by extension they will underestimate the degree of inequality of opportunity in their country. Conversely, individuals who perceive their life experiences to be failures - because for example they are unemployed - will tend to overemphasise the importance of circumstances beyond individual control - that is to say that they will overestimate the degree of inequality of opportunity.

In what follows we will empirically investigate the relationship between commonly used measures of inequality of opportunity and subjective measures of the same phenomenon. We will first introduce a very common method to measure inequality of opportunity proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010) and largely adopted by the empirical literature. We will then propose a method to measure the inequality of opportunity perception based on ordinal answer to questions in opinion survey. We will then merge information from two sources, an opinion survey and a survey on household incomes, to show the degree of correlation between measured and perceived inequality of opportunity in 23 European countries. Finally we will propose a model that explains individual perception of inequality of opportunity as both a function of individual traits and country-level variables. Such a specification allows to simultaneously evaluate the role of individual characteristics, including individual experience of success and failure in the labour market, and variable describing the main characteristics of their country.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept of equality of opportunity, one of the most widely adopted approaches to measure it, and proposes an index to measure inequality of opportunity perception. Section 3 presents estimates of inequality of opportunity and its perception in 23 European countries. In Section 4, we empirically investigate what factors influence the individual perception of the degree of equal of opportunity. Section 5 concludes.

2 Inequality of opportunity and its perception

A precondition for our analysis is a precise definition of what we mean when we talk about inequality of opportunity. Inequality of opportunity and social mobility have been at the centre of the research agenda in sociology and economics for at least four decades and a number of definitions, to a large extent overlapping, have been proposed in both disciplines.

Recent economic literature addressing the measurement of inequality of opportunity has grown since the early work done by van de Gaer (1993) and Roemer (1998). As already mentioned a vast range of definitions and measures have been proposed and implemented in the last two decades; the most prominent theoretical definitions in the literature have been recently summarized by Ferreira and Peragine (2015) and Roemer and Trannoy (2015), a survey of the empirical approaches to measure inequality of opportunity can be found in Ramos and Van de Gaer (2012), a meta analysis of the existing evidence is

proposed by Brunori et al. (2013).

In the following, we adopt the simple framework introduced by Checchi and Peragine (2010) to measure inequality of opportunity.

2.1 Two measures of inequality of opportunity

The conceptual basis for the definition of inequality of opportunity is provided by the distinction between individual efforts and pre-determined circumstances. This approach considers that inequality due to the former is not ethically offensive, whereas it suggests that differences in individual outcome due to the latter represent a violation of the principle of equality of opportunity and should therefore be removed.

Equation (1) is the simplest possible model to study inequality of opportunity: individual desirable outcome (y_i) is obtained as a function of two sets of traits: circumstances beyond individual control ($c = c_1, \dots, c_K$) and effort ($e = e_1, \dots, e_J$).

$$y_i = f(c_i, e_i) \quad (1)$$

Inequality of opportunity is identified as the inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control. In the literature, circumstances beyond individual control include all observable exogenous characteristics such as parental education, parental occupation, sex, and race. Because inequality due to choice or effort is generally unobservable it is obtained residually. To assess the degree of inequality of opportunity (i.e. the severity of the violation of equality of opportunity) we need a meaningful decomposition of total inequality ($I(y)$) which will allow us to separate inequality due to circumstances ($IOp(y)$) and inequality due to effort ($IOe(y)$).

There exist two prevailing methods to measure inequality of opportunity both based on Roemer's definition of equality of opportunity and translated into measures of inequality of opportunity by a number of authors (see Ferreira and Peragine (2015) and Roemer and Trannoy (2015)). Here we will follow the method introduced by Checchi and Peragine (2010).

Ex-post inequality of opportunity

The ex-post approach is based on the so called 'Roemer's strong equality of opportunity definition' which requires that individuals exerting the same degree of effort should obtain the same level of outcome. An ex-post measure of inequality of opportunity is therefore a measure of the inequality within individuals exerting same effort. To obtain such a measure we first partition the entire population into groups, called *types*, where each type includes all individuals characterised by the same circumstances. For example, a hypothetical country characterised by two circumstances, sex and race, would be partitioned in four types: black men, black women, white men, white women. Then, following Roemer (1998), we assume that effort (e) is orthogonal to circumstances (c), that is, any inequality correlated with circumstance is inequality due to opportunity. Under this assumption the degree of effort exerted by an individual can be measured as her position in the type-specific distribution of outcome. Individuals sitting at the same quantile of their type-specific outcome distribution are assumed to have exerted the same degree of effort

and form a *tranche*. For example, a black woman sitting at the top decile of her type-specific income distribution is considered to be exerting the same degree of effort of a white man in the richest 10% of his type-specific income distribution, they are part of the top 10% tranche. Our original distribution of income is now twice partitioned: in types (individuals affected by different circumstances) and in tranches (made of individuals that exert the same degree of effort). We can now measure *IOp* as inequality between types and *IOe* as inequality between tranches. To obtain this decomposition there are a number of methods which unfortunately lead to different *IOp* estimates (Fleurbaey, 2008; Ferreira and Peragine, 2015). Again, here we follow the popular approach proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010).

We consider inequality between tranches as legitimate because this is due to individual effort, whereas inequality within tranches we consider to be inequality of opportunity. Therefore we modify the original distribution of incomes: we first replace the individuals' income of those sharing same circumstances and same degree of effort with their mean income of (μ_k^j) . Then we further modify the distribution dividing μ_k^j by the mean outcome of the tranche (μ^j) . This transformation removes all inequality between tranches and leaves intact inequality within tranches. Inequality in this counterfactual distribution is therefore *IOp* and the remaining is *IOe*.

$$IOp_{EP} = I \left(\frac{\mu_k^j}{\mu^j} \right) \quad (2)$$

Ex-ante inequality of opportunity

Roemer's strong definition of equal opportunity is a very demanding condition which implies the distributions of outcome conditional on effort to be identical for all types. A second, less demanding, definition of equal opportunity has been drawn from Roemer's theory. The 'weak equality of opportunity' criterion allows some inequality within tranches but requires that that mean advantage levels should be the same across types (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011).

The *ex-ante* measure of inequality of opportunity proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010) is a measure based on this weaker definition. The approach interprets the type-specific outcome distribution as the opportunity set of individual belonging to each type. The (utilitarian) value of the opportunity set of each type is the mean outcome of the type. Therefore inequality of opportunity in this case is simply between-type inequality:

$$IOp_{EA} = I(\mu_k) \quad (3)$$

Where μ_k is the average outcome of type k .

Adopting the *ex-ante* approach greatly simplifies the measurement of inequality of opportunity and it is by far the most popular measure in the literature¹.

Unfortunately, the two measures differ except in the very unlikely case of constant effect of circumstances on outcome for different effort levels, that is inequality is identical within all tranches. This

¹Brunori et al. (2013) is a meta analysis of *ex-ante* inequality of opportunity measures in 41 countries.

difference stems from the tension between the principle of ex-post compensation and the principle of reward and is well known in the literature on fair allocation (Fleurbaey, 1995; 2008) and on the measurement of unfair inequalities (Fleurbaey and Shockkaert, 2009; Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2011). Because of this tension, any measure of inequality of opportunity can be fully consistent with one of the two principles but only partially satisfies the other. This explains why generally in the empirical literature both decomposition of total inequality are adopted.

Moreover it should be underlined that because not all circumstances are observable IO_{PEA} and IO_{PEP} can only be interpreted as a lower bound estimates of inequality due to opportunity in the distribution of y (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Luongo, 2011).

For our purposes, these measure of inequality of opportunity have two important features: they are widely adopted in the relevant literature and they have an intuitive meaning. The second property is crucial in this context because we aim to precisely compare measures and perceptions of the phenomenon. More sophisticated measures of inequality of opportunity may be much more distant from the intuitive meaning of the term².

2.2 A measure of inequality of opportunity perception

We now turn to the unexplored problem of quantifying the perceived degree of inequality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is a largely agreed upon political ideal. However, a part of its popularity may be explained by its vagueness: a large number of markedly heterogeneous interpretations of the terms can be found in the literature and in the public debate. The consequence is that when attempting to measure the perceived level of inequality of opportunity, we must be aware that respondents may indicate different things when referring to “equality of opportunity”.

However, opinion surveys often contain questions about the relevance of different factors in determining individual success. Answers to questions about the role of circumstances beyond individual control in determining individual success represent without ambiguity measures of the perceived violation of the principle of compensation. Each question, asking about the role of race, gender or socioeconomic background, captures a particular dimension in which the compensation principle is perceived to be violated. Then, the more relevant circumstances beyond individual control in determining outcomes, the higher the inequality of opportunity is perceived. Similarly, answers to questions about the role of effort and choice in determining success in life capture individual beliefs about the extent to which the principle of reward is violated. The more choice and effort are considered crucial to obtain valuable outcomes, the lower is the perceived level of inequality of opportunity.

Therefore a possible measure of perceived inequality of opportunity is a compound measure that aggregates a set of answers about the role of circumstances and responsibility variables in determining outcomes in life. This index should be monotonically increasing in all dimensions that measure perceived

²For example measure such as the *direct unfairness* and *fairness gap* introduced by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) may be considered preferable measures of inequality of opportunity because they explicitly balance the principle of compensation and reward. However, we consider the measures proposed by Checchi and Peragine more intuitive because of their reference to averages.

violations of the equality of opportunity ideal. What is not obvious is how to aggregate them in an index of perceived inequality of opportunity.

If questionnaires demand the filling in of answer categories with a cardinal meaning we can obtain such an index as a weighted combination of answers. This can be done following a normative approach: imposing degree of complementarity between dimensions and weights to each component. Alternatively we can rely on multivariate statistical methods, such as the principal component analysis, in order to aggregate information contained in a set of answers. The latter approach is particularly advisable when we suspect that observed dimensions of the phenomenon capture the same latent dimension. This implies a strong correlation between components and a problem of ‘double counting’ of the latent dimension when aggregating information (Decancq and Lugo, 2013).

However, in most cases, answers contained in value surveys are based on ordinal scales. If this is the case, the ordinal nature of the scale limits the types of operation we can perform with elements drawn from the scale and their aggregation is less straightforward. On the one hand, there exist methods to aggregate ordinal information by assigning values explicitly or implicitly in a numerical scale for all answers. On the other, if the objective is to aggregate information preserving the ordinal nature of the answers, we are compelled to use an algorithm operating directly on a pure ordinal scale (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2003). In what follows, we will endorse the latter approach, proposing an ordinal measure of inequality of opportunity perception based on a set of survey answers.

Assume we observe k answers measuring perceived violations of the equality of opportunity principle. All answers can assume the same set of ordinal values ($\lambda = A < B < \dots < Z$). For each individual we construct the vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_k)$ that contains the values of all answers ranked in ascending order so that $(v_1 \leq v_2 \leq \dots \leq v_k)$. \mathbf{v} contains perceived violations of the equal opportunity principle measured over k dimensions. Note that together with the intensity of the perceived violation the rank of dimensions may also vary between individuals. We measure perceived inequality of opportunity with the median based operator $IOpP$ which has a different definition in the following cases:

$$\text{case 1) } k \text{ is odd: } IOpP(v_1, \dots, v_k) = v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}$$

$$\text{case 2) } k \text{ is even and } v_{\frac{k}{2}} = v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}: IOpP = v_{\frac{k}{2}} = v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}$$

$$\text{case 3) } k \text{ is even and } v_{\frac{k}{2}} \neq v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}: v_{\frac{k}{2}} < IOpP < v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}$$

$$\text{case 4) } k \text{ is even, } v_{\frac{k}{2}} \neq v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}, \text{ and } \exists \text{ a nonempty set of values } U \text{ s.t. } v_{\frac{k}{2}} < u_i, \dots, u_j < v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}: IOpP = \text{median}(U)$$

In the first two cases $IOpP$ is the median of the vector \mathbf{v} , in the third case $IOpP$ defines a new ordinal value “between $v_{\frac{k}{2}}$ and $v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}$ ”, in the fourth case we pick the median of the set of values equal to or higher than $v_{\frac{k}{2}}$ and equal to or smaller than $v_{\frac{k+1}{2}}$.³

Consider a simple example: a questionnaire contains four questions: two concerns the perceived violation of the principle of reward and two concern the violation of the principle of compensation.

³If again the median is not an ordinal value belonging to λ we apply the same method used for case 3 and 4.

Possible answer are A, B, C, D, E , where A indicates that the principle is not at all violated, the answer E expresses the maximum possible level of perceived violation, and they are assumed to be equally spaced.

Individual i, j and l report the following answers:

	comp. 1	comp. 2	reward 1	reward 2
individual i	D	C	C	A
individual j	D	C	D	C
individual l	E	A	A	E

Then:

$$\mathbf{v}^i = (A, C, C, D)$$

$$\mathbf{v}^j = (C, C, D, D)$$

$$\mathbf{v}^l = (A, A, E, E)$$

and

$$IOpP^i = C$$

$$IOpP^j = CD$$

$$IOpP^l = C$$

Note that for individual j the median of \mathbf{v}^j would be the mean between category C and D which cannot be calculated on an ordinal scale. To preserve the ordinal nature of the scale $IOpP$ operator defines a new ordinal value: $C < IOpP^j = CD < D$. The only case in which we are not preserving the ordinal nature of answers is the case in which to calculate the median we must calculate the mean of two non contiguous answers (individual l). Although these cases may be rare in practice, the example above - where $IOpP^i = IOpP^l$ - makes clear that our measure contains a certain degree of cardinality.

In what follows we will adopt $IOpP$ to quantify the perceived level of inequality of opportunity. $IOpP$ is an ordinal measure that assigns same weight to each dimension included in the analysis. $IOpP$ has the needed property of being monotonically increasing in all the relevant dimensions. An increase in any of the values measuring perceived violation of the two principles implies a change of $IOpP$ greater than or equal to zero.

3 Inequality of opportunity and its perception in 23 European countries

The data requirements for studying the relationship between inequality of opportunity and its perception are rather demanding. It requires both information on public opinion and a precise record of incomes and individual circumstances. These two types of information are rarely contained in a unique dataset. We

therefore merge information from two sources: the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2009) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 2011). Although the first survey contains opinions recorded in 2009 and the second contains incomes earned in 2010, we consider the two surveys as if they were conducted simultaneously. This small asynchrony may be ignored because the persistence of income distribution may be high across a single year and also because the phenomenon we are dealing with is measured and judged in a time horizon of two generations. Conversely, the fact that ISSP was conducted in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (2007-08) represents a potential threat for the external validity of our analysis. It may be possible that individual perceptions have been modified after a shock that has reduced expectations for future growth, at least in the richest economies. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) for example have shown that individuals experiencing recessions tend to believe that economic success is more influenced by luck than effort and choices.

Given the large overlap of the two samples we are able to study a subsample of 23 European countries included both in EU-SILC 2011 and ISSP 2009: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Latvia (LT), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT) Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK).

The data needed to measure *IOP* is a representative survey of individuals containing information about: income, socioeconomic background, country of origin and possibly all the other circumstances beyond individual control that play a role in determining income. Although ISSP 2009 contains all these variables, because its sampling strategy is constructed to correctly represent opinions and not individual economic condition it cannot be considered sufficiently reliable to estimate other phenomena such as the income distribution. In particular, comparing the household income variable - the outcome of interest in this analysis - with official estimates, we have found systematic inconsistencies. We therefore estimate *IOP* for the sample of European countries exploiting the Survey on Income and Living Conditions, (EU-SILC). EU-SILC is a reliable source for the analysis of the income distribution. Moreover, it has already been utilised by a number of authors in the study of equality of opportunity. The wave collected in 2010 contains a module about intergenerational transmission of disadvantages which includes information about socioeconomic background. We follow other contributions by limiting our analysis to a subsample of respondents: working age, adult individuals aged between 25 and 65 (Marrero and Rodriguez, 2012; Checchi et al, 2015). We implement a non-parametric approach to estimate *IOP*, identifying groups of individuals sharing same circumstances and then partitioning each group into three income tranches⁴. This procedure is demanding in terms of sample size and forces us to consider only three circumstances beyond individual control: parental education, parental occupation and gender (16 types), Table 6 in the Appendix reports the distribution of circumstances across countries. IOP_{EP} , IOP_{EA} is then calculated as the mean logarithmic deviation applied to the counterfactual distribution (equations 2 and 3) where the

⁴Note that due to the sample size of types in our partition the number of quantiles used is smaller than what is used by other authors: Checchi and Peragine (2010) for example use five quantiles. We face a sort of bias-variance trade off here: on the one hand limiting the number of quantiles can in principle bias downward our estimates (Luongo, 2011), on the other estimating within group variability in groups with small sample size will increase the variance of the estimates obtained.

outcome y is the household income divided by the square root of the number of household components⁵. Other contributions identify individual outcome with earnings or - especially in poorer countries - with per capita consumption. We prefer to use equivalent income which allows us to include in the analysis all individuals without individual earnings which nevertheless benefit from a positive income. Table 1 reports the sample size, mean income, total inequality, IOp_{EP} and IOp_{EA} (both in levels and as share of total inequality). IOp_{EP} varies between 0.0008 (0.53% of total inequality) in Denmark and 0.0330 (16.04%) in Bulgaria. IOp_{EA} is slightly lower ranging between 0.36% in Denmark and 12.99% in Bulgaria. The two measures are extremely closely correlated ($\rho = 0.9699$, $p = 0.0000$).

Table 1: EU-SILC descriptive statistics

Country	Sample	Equivalent income	GDP per capita	GDP growth (%)	Inequality (Gini)	Inequality (MLD)	Ex-ante IOp (MLD)	Ex-ante IOp (%)	Ex-post IOp (MLD)	Ex-post IOp (%)
AT	6,686	25,110	35,200	1.11	0.2667	0.1277	0.0033	2.58	0.0034	2.64
BE	6,025	22,950	33,600	1.09	0.2572	0.1263	0.0063	5.02	0.0076	5.98
BG	7,398	9,963	4,900	1.61	0.3337	0.2057	0.0267	12.99	0.0330	16.04
CH	7,322	24,177	55,700	1.10	0.2794	0.1409	0.0079	5.61	0.0058	4.09
CY	5,188	27,475	23,000	1.12	0.2783	0.1365	0.0050	3.68	0.0061	4.48
CZ	7,220	13,727	14,900	1.34	0.2607	0.1200	0.0090	7.54	0.0072	5.98
DE	12,185	24,154	31,500	1.10	0.2904	0.1420	0.0027	1.89	0.0031	2.21
DK	2,784	23,155	43,500	1.03	0.2640	0.1569	0.0006	0.36	0.0008	0.54
EE	5,485	11,406	11,000	1.46	0.3224	0.1993	0.0113	5.66	0.0077	3.87
ES	16,104	18,022	23,200	1.08	0.3221	0.2101	0.0082	3.91	0.0097	4.63
FI	5,170	22,796	34,900	1.14	0.2647	0.1168	0.0016	1.40	0.0017	1.44
FR	11,536	23,839	30,800	1.06	0.2989	0.1573	0.0065	4.15	0.0071	4.54
HU	14,327	11,382	9,800	1.25	0.2754	0.1277	0.0136	10.68	0.0157	12.29
IS	1,750	19,228	31,500	1.15	0.2570	0.1106	0.0015	1.31	0.0014	1.27
IT	22,076	20,141	26,800	0.03	0.3134	0.1990	0.0105	5.28	0.0112	5.62
LT	5,384	9,410	9,000	3.39	0.3319	0.2151	0.0075	3.47	0.0056	2.62
NO	2,752	29,606	66,200	1.07	0.2320	0.0951	0.0013	1.38	0.0017	1.80
PL	15,606	12,151	9,300	1.46	0.3141	0.1776	0.0101	5.68	0.0099	5.60
PT	6,331	15,027	17,000	1.05	0.3380	0.1975	0.0159	8.03	0.0188	9.55
SE	1,143	20,045	39,400	1.17	0.2394	0.1072	0.0008	0.72	0.0027	2.53
SI	5,243	17,026	17,700	1.26	0.2577	0.1020	0.0048	4.67	0.0060	5.90
SK	7,562	13,162	12,400	1.59	0.2646	0.1329	0.0044	3.31	0.0047	3.56
UK	6,598	21,716	28,900	1.11	0.3244	0.1868	0.0081	4.32	0.0079	4.24

Equivalent income and GDP per capita are expressed in euro PPP ESA 2010.

Source: Author' calculation based on EU-SILC (2011) and Eurostat (2015)

To measure the perception of inequality of opportunity, we use opinions recorded in the ISSP 2009. ISSP is a continuing annual programme of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering a number of topics relevant for social scientists. The wave recorded in 2009 contains information about how social mobility and equality of opportunity are experienced and perceived together with a number of individual-level covariates (ISSP Research Group, 2012). ISSP has been widely adopted in the sociological literature and it is increasingly seen as a reliable source of information to analyse individual perception also by economists.⁶ Descriptive statistics of the average values of respondents characteristics in the 23 samples are reported in Table 3 in Section 4.

⁵Although other inequality measures, such as the Gini, have been suggested as better measure IOp , the mean logarithmic deviation has been traditionally adopted because of its perfect and path independent decomposability into between and within groups (Checchi and Pragine, 2010).

⁶See among others (Engelhardt and Wagener, 2014; Kerr, 2014; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2015).

In order to estimate *IOP* we combine the answer to a number of questions that we believe capture the perception of the phenomenon. From the ISSP questions about the importance of different individual characteristics for “getting ahead in life” we select the following:

1. coming from a wealthy family?
2. knowing the right people?
3. a person’s race/ethnicity?
4. a person’s religion?
5. being born a man or a woman?
6. having ambition?
7. hard work?

Possible answers are: 1=essential, 2=very important, 3=fairly important, 4=not very important, 5=not at all important.

We also included the answer of the following question:

8. *“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: In <country> people have the same chances to enter university, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or social background.”?*

Possible answers are: 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=,Neither agree nor disagree 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree.

The first five questions (and question eight) measure the perceived violation of the principle of compensation: if the respondent identifies family wealth, connections, religion, race, or gender as important characteristics for success in life, then the degree of inequality of opportunity she perceives is high. Questions 6 and 7 measure to what extent the principle of reward is perceived to be satisfied: the more hard work and ambition are considered important determinants of success the higher the degree of perceived equal opportunity. Table 2 reports the share of respondents that considered each determinant at least very important to get ahead in life. The picture we get is very heterogeneous and contains a number of interesting outliers. A high number of respondents in transition economies consider family wealth to be at least very important (above 45% in Bulgaria and Poland) while the lowest percentage is found in Finland. Connections are considered at least very important by almost 70% of the Bulgarian and Polish interviewees, but by less than 21% of the French respondents. Race is considered to be at least very important by about 30% of the Hungarian. Religion appears to be a relevant determinant of success for a small share of respondent, less than 10% in all countries but in Bulgaria and Slovak Republic. Italy has the highest percentage of respondents considering gender essential or very important to success in

life (19%). The lowest percentage is found in Denmark with 5 % of respondents considering sex at least very important.

As far as the questions regarding the reward principle are concerned Estonia again signals a high degree of perceived *IOP* with only 46% of the respondents considering ambition at least very important, the highest percentage is found in Poland (91%). Finally, “hard work” is viewed as an essential element of success in Iceland (93%) while, at the opposite end of the scale is Denmark with only 43% of respondents convinced of its importance.

Table 2 shows a large heterogeneity, both in the absolute importance and the ranking of different sources of inequality. Religion is on average considered the main source of unequal opportunity; ambition and hard work are also perceived as important factors to succeed in life. “Knowing the right people” is on average perceived to be the least important of the variables considered.

Table 2: Dimensions of inequality of opportunity perception

Country	Family wealth	Connections	Race	Religion	Gender	University*	Ambition	Hard work
AT	0.2972	0.6184	0.1825	0.0994	0.183	0.6258	0.7705	0.6736
BE	0.1272	0.5035	0.113	0.0671	0.076	0.5814	0.5682	0.6503
BG	0.452	0.714	0.1767	0.1263	0.1629	0.7286	0.8949	0.8631
CH	0.1258	0.4944	0.0811	0.0607	0.126	0.6597	0.6346	0.6649
CY	0.3525	0.5011	0.1171	0.0651	0.0705	0.6432	0.8536	0.8796
CZ	0.2662	0.5596	0.1987	0.0843	0.1721	0.5263	0.6826	0.748
DE	0.2816	0.6437	0.1586	0.0714	0.142	0.4369	0.7924	0.7093
DK	0.0779	0.3336	0.0585	0.0491	0.0577	0.7007	0.6586	0.4344
EE	0.2574	0.5546	0.1193	0.0311	0.0652	0.5576	0.4645	0.6905
ES	0.3231	0.522	0.1048	0.0682	0.0936	0.5856	0.5647	0.6825
FI	0.0527	0.3108	0.0403	0.0484	0.0471	0.6814	0.5182	0.6402
FR	0.0897	0.2118	0.084	0.039	0.0823	0.4335	0.6107	0.5561
HU	0.4262	0.5496	0.2899	0.0931	0.1865	0.4376	0.7714	0.7234
IS	0.1049	0.366	0.0832	0.0468	0.0912	0.7241	0.9019	0.9316
IT	0.3862	0.6207	0.1211	0.0565	0.1932	0.4632	0.6214	0.6087
LT	0.4068	0.5166	0.0584	0.0252	0.0534	0.5821	0.571	0.7704
NO	0.1065	0.3561	0.1481	0.0349	0.0657	0.7529	0.8835	0.822
PL	0.4928	0.7239	0.1036	0.1044	0.1428	0.4556	0.9149	0.8596
PT	0.3451	0.4586	0.1051	0.0819	0.0955	0.4166	0.7224	0.8722
SE	0.1332	0.3949	0.0769	0.0482	0.0953	0.651	0.8565	0.7704
SI	0.3251	0.6845	0.1016	0.0866	0.1711	0.7508	0.7433	0.7187
SK	0.3848	0.6893	0.1822	0.1141	0.1553	0.5432	0.7391	0.7647
UK	0.1471	0.3281	0.0848	0.0836	0.0815	0.5445	0.7207	0.854

Determinants to get ahead in life: share of respondents answering ‘essential’ or ‘very important’. (*) Equality of opportunity in access to university: share of respondents answering ‘Strongly agree’ or ‘agree’.

Share of answers are obtained using sample weights when available.

Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009.

To measure *IOP* we first make the five questions about compensation consistent with the other three - that is, we recode them so that 1=“not at all important” and 5=“essential”. Because the number of considered dimensions is even, the resultant index of inequality of opportunity perception, *IOP*, is the median of the eight answers and is in few cases between two possible answers; it ranges between 1 and

5 and assumes nine possible values. Note that it is never the case that the two answers used to calculate the median (4th and 5th lowest perceptions) are not contiguous, this implies that all values have clear ordinal meaning. *IOPP* assumes value 1 when at least five of the eight factors violating the principle of equal opportunity are judged as “not at all important” and it assumes value 5 when at least five of the seven violations are perceived as essential.


However, there is an important potential threat to the reliability of our measure of perceived inequality of opportunity. Constructing *IOPP* we are implicitly aggregating eight dimensions assigning the same relative weight to all questions. In the absence of a criterion to assign different weights, this choice may be legitimate only if the eight questions actually capture distinct dimensions of the phenomenon. If this is not the case, we may risk incurring the problem of double counting. That is, we are adding up dimensions that are proxies of the same latent dimension which end up being disproportionately weighted. However, if this were the case, we should expect to find a strong correlation between answers - a correlation that, in our case, does not seem to occur. Table 9 in the Appendix reports correlations between each pair of answers. The correlations have the expected signs, are in the majority of the case highly statistically significant, but are rather weak (never above 0.5). Therefore we can exclude the double counting problem and we use all eight dimensions to calculate *IOPP*.

Figure 3 reports perceived and measured *IOP* in the 23 European countries. The top scatterplots present correlation of *IOP* and *IOPP* in absolute terms for both ex-post (left) and ex-ante (right) measures. The correlation coefficient calculated on this sample of countries is rather weak and not statistically significant. Although, it should be noted that an increase in *IOP* is associated with a slight increase in *IOPP*; many countries with a similar degree of equality of opportunity show very different perceptions of the phenomenon. Belgium and United Kingdom have very similar *IOP* values but are found at the two extremes in terms of perception. Similarly Bulgaria has four times the *IOP* of Switzerland but very similar average perception⁷. However, it is possible that the perception of inequality of opportunity is an inherently relative concept: respondents tend to assess the relative position of their own countries in terms of equal opportunities rather than the absolute intensity of the phenomenon. The bottom scatterplots report the same correlations looking at the rank of countries. Again, average perception is very far from the actual ranking of countries based on the *IOP* measures, with some countries extremely far from what is expected (the 45 degree line).

Such descriptive figures suggest that individual perception of inequality of opportunity weakly correlates with scholarly measurement of it. However, a possible explanation for such a weak association could be related to the way we have measured inequality of opportunity. There are many methods to measure inequality of opportunity and different approaches can lead to systematically different estimates. In order to control whether different measures of inequality of opportunity would better correlate with *IOPP* we consider inequality of opportunity as measured by Checchi et al. (2015) and Brzeziński (2015). The two studies are based on the same data but follow different measurement approaches. Both opt for an ex-ante measure of inequality of opportunity and consider different set of circumstances beyond individ-

⁷Note that Bulgaria represents a clear outlier and its removal does improve the correlation between *IOP* and *IOPP* which becomes 0.367 (p=0.09) for ex-post *IOP* and 0.3902 (p=0.07) for ex-ante *IOP*.

Figure 1: Inequality of opportunity: measure and perception




Inequality of opportunity ex-post is IOp_{EP} in eq. 2, inequality of opportunity ex-ante is IOp_{EA} in eq. 3. Attitude toward inequality is the average $IOpP$ index in each country. Correlation coefficient with IOp_{EP} is $\rho = 0.1834$ ($p = 0.4023$) and with IOp_{EA} is $\rho = 0.2013$ ($p = 0.3571$). Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP (2009) and EU-SILC (2011).

ual control. Checchi et al. (2015) adopt a non-parametric approach and choose the Gini coefficient to measure inequality in the counterfactual distribution (equation 3). Brzeziński (2015) follows a parametric approach. Figure 2 shows the correlation between $IOpP$ and these alternative estimates. Although the two figures are not perfectly comparable with ours, because the set of countries is not exactly the same, we nevertheless find a similar positive correlation, 0.1815 and 0.3326 respectively, but again not statistically significant⁸. We may therefore exclude that the finding of weak correlation between measure of inequality of opportunity and its perception is exclusively driven by the method chosen to measure IOp .

Finally, because a correlation in a scatterplot of 23 observations may be difficult to judge, we have looked also at the correlation between IOp and $IOpP$ in 68 European regions. Regions are obtained disaggregating by macro-areas larger countries. Table 7 in the appendix contains the details of the subdivision. However, due to the limited sample size of many regions it has been impossible to estimate ex-post IOp in this case. Therefore Figure 3 shows the correlation perceived and only the ex-ante in-

⁸The list of countries and IOp estimates for the three studies are reported in Table 8 in the Appendix.


Figure 2: Inequality of opportunity and its perception: alternative *IOP* measures



Source: Brzeziński (2015) and Checchi et al. (2015).

equality of opportunity measure. The correlation is very close to zero (0.0288) and not statistically significant.

Figure 3: Measured and perceived *IOP* in 68 European regions



$\rho = 0.0288$, $p - \text{value} = 0.8159$
 Source: ISSP(2009) and EU-SILC (2011).

4 Determinants of the inequality of opportunity perception

The descriptive figures presented in the previous section show that individuals' perceptions do not amount to an unbiased average perception of *IOP*. We have suggested that *IOPP* may differ from *IOP* because in quantifying the role of circumstances on successes and failures, individuals may tend to weigh personal experiences too heavily. If this is the case, their evaluation of *IOP* may be distorted by what is experienced by some reference group of individuals and in particular by personal experience. In what follows we specify a model able to identify a number of determinants of the individual perception of inequality of opportunity. Because we have aggregated the seven answers, preserving their ordinal nature, *IOPP* is a multichotomous dependent variable. For individual i in country j we assume that there is a latent continuous metric underlying the ordinal answer to the median of the eight questions ($\zeta_{i,j}^*$). We assume also that the latent variable is a linear combination of a number of independent determinants at individual levels (x), a set of cutpoints (μ), and an unobserved individual effect ϵ .

$$\zeta_{i,j}^* = x'_{i,j}\beta + \epsilon_{i,j} \quad (4)$$

Inequality of opportunity varies across countries; it is therefore safe to assume a component of the individual effect is shared by respondents from the same country. If this is the case, $\epsilon_{i,j}$ should be written as the sum of an individual and a country unobservable effect:

$$\zeta_{i,j}^* = x'_{i,j}\beta + \nu_j + \epsilon_{i,j} \quad (5)$$

ν_j can be a fixed effect or can be influenced by a number of country level variables. In the latter case, it can be written as a function of a set of country level variables (z) and an unobserved country specific effect (u).

$$\zeta_{i,j}^* = x'_{i,j}\beta + z'_j\gamma + u_j + \epsilon_{i,j} \quad (6)$$

ζ^* is not observable. What we observe is:

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta_{i,j} &= \text{lowest value of IOPP if } \zeta_{i,j}^* < \mu_1 \\ \zeta_{i,j} &= \text{second lowest value of IOPP if } \mu_1 < \zeta_{i,j}^* \leq \mu_2 \\ &\dots \\ \zeta_{i,j} &= \text{highest value of IOPP if } \mu_8 \leq \zeta_{i,j}^* \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

If the mean and variance for ϵ are normalised to be zero and $\pi^2/3$ and assumed independent of u_j we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Prob}(\zeta_{i,j} = \text{lowest value of IOpP} | x, z) &= H(\mu_1 - \zeta_{i,j}) & (8) \\
\text{Prob}(\zeta_{i,j} = \text{second lowest value of IOpP} | x, z) &= H(\mu_2 - \zeta_{i,j}) - H(\mu_1 - \zeta_{i,j}) \\
&\dots \\
\text{Prob}(\zeta_{i,j} = \text{highest value of IOpP} | x, z) &= 1 - H(\mu_8 - \zeta_{i,j})
\end{aligned}$$

Where $\zeta_{i,j}$ can be specified according to equations (3), (4) or (5) and $H(\cdot)$ is the logistic cumulative distribution function. These probabilities and the degree of association with some explanatory variables can be estimated by maximum likelihood with an ordered logit regression model (Green, 2003; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). We specify three versions of the ordered logistic model: (equation 3) a pooled model with corrections of the standard error to account for data clustered in 23 countries, (equation 4) a pooled model with country fixed effects, and (equation 5) a mixed two level model. The latter is a two-level model in which individuals are nested in countries. For the first two models we include among regressors individual controls: the age of the respondent, her sex, her education (whether she at least completed upper secondary level education or not), her employment status (worker, unemployed, retired), and area of residence (rural/urban). Moreover, in order to test for the presence of a self-esteem bias, we add two dummy variables: downward mobility and upward mobility. The former takes value one if the respondent considers the job qualification she has today lower than the job qualification that her father had when she was between 14 and 16 years of age. The latter takes value 1 if the respondent considers her job qualification higher⁹. The mixed model includes also country level regressors. Because the inclusion of many cluster level controls has been shown to be problematic for similar numbers of clusters (Bryan and Jankins, 2015) we limit the number of country level controls to three: IOp in 2010, GDP per capita in PPP, and the GDP per capita growth in the 1999-2009 decade. Table 4 contains the coefficients for the three specifications of the model.

Estimates are consistent across specifications. However, the likelihood-ratio test ($\chi^2 = 356.33$, $Prob > \chi^2 = 0.0000$) suggests that there is enough variability between countries to prefer a multilevel ordered logistic model over a standard ordered logistic model. We therefore focus on the interpretation of model (5).

We first assess whether the categories constructed by aggregating the eight answers are distinguishable categories for the respondents looking at the cutpoints (μ_1, \dots, μ_8) confidence intervals. Categories with overlapping confidence intervals in an ordinal model are interpreted as signaling that ordinal categories are indistinguishable and would suggest to collapse those categories. However, in our case the values of the perception variable seem to be perceived as well distinguished by individuals. Threshold parameters are significantly different at a 95% level of confidence. Indeed, thresholds are equally spread out, suggesting that the categories we have constructed do not differ much in scope.

⁹Note that we are assuming that individuals are able to assess their level of qualification relative to that of their parents, which is not necessarily always the case (Webb, 2000).

Table 3: ISSP descriptive statistics

country	sample	male	married	age	urban	degree	worker	unemployed	retired	down. mob.	up. mob.
AT	929	0.44	0.47	44.67	0.28	0.2526	0.5494	0.0530	0.2811	0.1615	0.3690
BE	1,036	0.46	0.59	47.78	0.20	0.5799	0.5383	0.0371	0.2604	0.1751	0.3484
BG	964	0.46	0.58	46.68	0.44	0.6996	0.5132	0.1176	0.2780	0.1453	0.3530
CH	1,189	0.43	0.58	47.38	0.25	0.3151	0.6270	0.0228	0.1704	0.1937	0.4194
CY	918	0.46	0.63	40.90	0.47	0.6610	0.6920	0.0230	0.0970	0.1480	0.3950
CZ	1,117	0.44	0.49	43.15	0.31	0.3489	0.5169	0.0681	0.2262	0.1945	0.2862
DE	1,325	0.48	0.55	48.17	0.27	0.2495	0.5305	0.0566	0.2796	0.2151	0.3484
DK	1,411	0.44	0.55	48.55	0.36	0.7964	0.5830	0.0257	0.2319	0.1509	0.4289
EE	950	0.42	0.35	44.92	0.46	0.7129	0.5403	0.0800	0.2013	0.1959	0.3051
ES	1,163	0.46	0.54	45.23	0.25	0.4065	0.4097	0.1812	0.2078	0.1772	0.4207
FI	798	0.45	0.49	41.79	0.40	0.5134	0.5666	0.0586	0.1791	0.1526	0.3986
FR	2,762	0.45	0.56	46.79	0.21	0.4938	0.5733	0.0400	0.2814	0.2181	0.4333
HU	963	0.44	0.46	46.12	0.37	0.3975	0.4691	0.0779	0.3288	0.1950	0.2905
IS	862	0.44	0.51	43.78	0.00	0.4245	0.6769	0.0327	0.1162	0.2196	0.2365
IT	984	0.42	0.59	46.69	0.10	0.3902	0.4371	0.0531	0.2523	0.2048	0.3845
LT	985	0.36	0.49	42.85	0.44	0.7240	0.5669	0.0702	0.2011	0.1880	0.2788
NO	1,345	0.45	0.52	45.38	0.37	0.7397	0.6806	0.0110	0.1346	0.1683	0.3956
PL	1,169	0.44	0.49	43.14	0.28	0.5447	0.5367	0.0859	0.2499	0.2367	0.3984
PT	955	0.44	0.57	45.27	0.00	0.3024	0.6055	0.0713	0.1715	0.1702	0.4885
SE	1,056	0.45	0.49	46.71	0.38	0.4820	0.6763	0.0378	0.1697	0.1944	0.4011
SI	947	0.41	0.61	44.20	0.22	0.4826	0.5333	0.0601	0.2582	0.1803	0.2967
SK	1,077	0.43	0.56	42.17	0.17	0.4111	0.5001	0.0877	0.2160	0.1719	0.3564
UK	940	0.47	0.51	46.91	0.32	0.4282	0.5794	0.0596	0.2245	0.2301	0.3870

Descriptive statistics are calculated using sample weights where available.

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009.

The interpretation of the coefficients varies depending on the category considered. An increase in one of the regressors with a positive coefficient is equivalent to shifting the distribution to the right. This shift has an unambiguous consequence on the first and last categories (minimum and maximum perceived level of IOp) because it shifts some mass out of the first interval $[-\infty, \mu_1]$ and toward the last interval $[\mu_8, \infty]$. Therefore, to be male and older reduces the probability of having the lowest possible perception of inequality of opportunity. Moreover, urban residence, a variable often included as a proxy for reference group in models of relative deprivation, significantly increases the degree of inequality of opportunity perceived. Interpreting this coefficient one should take into account the possibility that urban residents have a different reference group than other citizens when assessing inequalities. Moreover, it should be recalled what shown in Figure 3: regions in which largest European cities are located seems to have higher level of inequality of opportunity.

The self-esteem hypothesis is confirmed for the lowest and highest category by the highly significant coefficients for the downward and upward mobility variables. Moreover, we may interpret the sign of the control for unemployment status as part of the same mechanism. The coefficient are very similar both using the ex-post and the ex-ante measure of inequality of opportunity. As expected what is effected by the choice of the measure are country level controls: GDP per capita and its growth increase the probability to have the lowest possible perception of unequal opportunities. The sign of the control for economic growth recalls the "tunnel effect" proposed by the literature to explain a lower aversion to inequality in more dynamic countries. However, this coefficient is statistically significant from zero only

Table 4: Individual *IOP* perception: ordered logit estimates

Variable	(3) Pooled	(4) Country fixed effect	(5) Mixed (ex-post)	(5) Mixed (ex-ante)
number of observations	18,929	18,929	18,929	18,929
Education	-0.0976 ***	-0.0116	-0.0145	-0.0064
Male	0.0805 ***	0.0876 ***	0.0852 ***	0.0900 ***
Age	0.0031 **	0.0053 ***	0.0052 ***	0.0052 ***
Married	-0.0647 *	-0.066 *	-0.0691 *	-0.0617 *
Upward mover	-0.1090 ***	-0.0967 ***	-0.0930 ***	-0.1021 ***
Downward mover	0.1389 ***	0.1776 ***	0.1793 ***	0.1754 ***
Unemployed	0.2212 ***	0.2097 ***	0.2203 ***	0.2060 ***
Retired	-0.0708	-0.1027 *	-0.0948 *	-0.1071
Worker	-0.0652	-0.0567	-0.0555	-0.0576
Urban	0.0408	0.0978 ***	0.0923 ***	0.0994 ***
Country fixed-effect	NO	YES	NO	NO
<i>IOP</i>			-19.6392 ***	-6.9305 ***
GDP p.c.			-0.0003	-0.0071 ***
Growth			-0.1650 ***	-0.2147
Cut points				
μ_1	-2.255 ***	-1.613 ***	-2.1188 ***	-2.6383 ***
μ_2	-1.549 ***	-0.9006 ***	-1.4061 ***	-1.9255 ***
μ_3	0.3529 ***	1.042 ***	0.5341 ***	0.01683 ***
μ_4	1.0628 ***	1.7685 ***	1.259 ***	0.7428 ***
μ_5	2.7376 ***	3.4653 ***	2.9554 ***	2.4388 ***
μ_6	3.4421 ***	4.1743 ***	3.6642 ***	3.1476 ***
μ_7	5.0772 ***	5.8131 ***	5.3029 ***	4.7864 ***
μ_8	5.4684 ***	6.2048 ***	5.6946 ***	5.1781 ***

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009; EU-SILC, 2011, Eurostat, 2015.

when *IOP* is estimated ex-post (the opposite happens for GDP per capita). Interestingly enough, the objective measure of *IOP* seems to have negative impact on the perception of inequality of opportunity itself. The sign is the same for both ex-ante and ex-post measure but the magnitude of the coefficient significantly differ. However, these interpretations cannot be extended to the seven middle categories because the shift of the distribution implies that some mass will move into each of the middle categories but some will also move out.

To evaluate the effect of our control across all the IOP categories, we report the marginal effects for all categories and all variables in Table 5.

As expected, the marginal effects for the first category have the opposite sign of the coefficients. For both specification (ex-ante and ex-post) a positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the regressor reduces the probability of the lowest category; this implies a negative marginal effect for the probability to be in the first category. Age, unemployment status, urban residence, being male, and having experienced downward mobility reduce the probability of having a low perception of inequality of opportunity. Conversely, respondents who are in a stable relationship and have experienced upward mobility are more likely to perceive a low level of inequality of opportunity. Marginal effects for the probability of being

in the third category, where we find the majority of respondents, have all the same signs but are lower in terms of magnitude. The country level controls show that, after controlling for all the other observable covariates, GDP growth in the last decade affect *IOP*: the perception of inequality of opportunity decreases in more dynamic countries. However, as already shown in Table 4, another interesting result is that the measure of inequality of opportunity included among controls has the opposite effect on its perception (increases the probability to be in the first categories) and this effect is statistically significant when *IOP_{EP}* is used as control.

Although we are reluctant to conclude that the way economists measure inequality of opportunity has nothing to do with the way it is perceived by people, these estimates suggest that other country characteristics and individual variables play a clearer role in determining *IOP* perception.

Finally, in Figure 4 we report for each category the 95% confidence interval for predicted odd ratios of the two type of respondents: upward movers and downward movers. The precision of the estimates is very different for the two groups (there are twice as many upward movers as there are downward movers) moreover the very low probability of observing individuals with extreme *IOP* makes the two categories less distinguishable for the last two levels of inequality of opportunity perception. However, the distribution of the odd ratios across categories show that, other things held constant, the experience of intergenerational mobility significantly modifies the perception of inequality of opportunity¹⁰. Note that *IOP* is constructed by aggregating information about eight questions, but none of them explicitly refers to occupational mobility. Moreover, questions about personal experiences of social mobility are unlikely to have framed these answers because they are asked later in the questionnaire. Aware that the controls available are limited, leaving a large part of *IOP* variability unexplained or explained by country fixed effect, we interpret our results as evidence of the role of individual experience in biasing inequality of opportunity perception.

4.1 Robustness checks


We perform a number of robustness checks to exclude that the obtained results are driven by methodological choices about how *IOP* is constructed and how inequality of opportunity is measured.

We know that our measure of *IOP* has been obtained by aggregating eight components, following only one of the possible procedures. In order to check the robustness of our results, we run our analysis using three alternative measures of inequality of opportunity perception.

The first alternative consists in assigning cardinal meaning to ordinal scale (one to five) and constructing a variable of perception summing all components in a scalar. We then estimate a mixed linear model that explains the sum of eight components with the same controls, estimates are reported in Table 10 in the Appendix. As far as individual control are concerned the coefficient obtained regressing the sum of components on our controls are very similar to those in Table 4 (coefficients for higher education,

¹⁰For upward movers *IOP* is more likely to take the three lowest values, the opposite is true for the other six values. This is consistent with the inversion of the sign of the marginal effect which takes place for all variables between category three and four. That is when the median answer is between ‘not very important’ and ‘fairly important’ for questions about circumstances, between ‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’ for questions about effort dimensions, and between ‘agree’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree’ for the question about whether there is equality of opportunity in access to university.

Figure 4: Perception of IOP for upward and downward movers



Intervals correspond to 95% confidence intervals
 Source: ISSP(2009) and EU-SILC (2011).

marital status and retired improve their statistical significance). The coefficient for IOP_{EP} and IOP_{EA} are again negative but not significant. The other two coefficients for country-control variables have negative and significant sign.

The second alternative represents the opposite approach: instead of reducing eight dimensions to one, we specify a mixed ordered logit model for each dimension of the index in order to verify the consistency of our results across dimensions. Table 11 in the Appendix reports the coefficients estimated for the eight models when IOP_{EP} is used to control for measured inequality of opportunity¹¹. We already know that the components are weakly correlated and therefore we expect heterogeneity of coefficients across dimensions. The majority of coefficients do not have the same sign in the eight specifications. Only the coefficient for upward movers dummy is negative (or not significantly different from zero) in all specifications and significant in the majority of cases. Being a downward mover is associated with a positive coefficients or insignificant coefficients in all dimensions but ambition. Being resident in a urban is associated with a positive coefficient, significant in six dimesions¹². Again country-level coefficients are unstable. Measured inequality of opportunity have both positive (Family wealth, connections, race), and negative sign (religion, access to university, ambition and hard work). More stable are the coefficients

¹¹Similar coefficients are obtained using IOP_{EA} and are available upon request.

¹²Interestingly, being male increases the perceived level of inequality of opportunity in all dimensions except when the question concerns the role of gender and ambition in shaping individual opportunities.

for GDP growth and GDP in levels, negative and significant in the majority of the dimensions. Such a large heterogeneity of coefficients indicates that different aggregation methods to obtain *IOPP* - for example based on weighted aggregation of the components - could lead to different estimates. We have opted for an unweighted aggregation of the components; a different choice is possible provided that we can propose a reasonable criterion to set question-specific weights.

The third alternative measure of inequality of opportunity is based on the idea that the principle of reward might in fact be secondary to the principle of compensation in determining individual perception of the phenomenon. Therefore we specify a measure of perception (*IOPP**) based on the same median-based algorithm but excluding the two questions about ambition and hard work. Comparing the results in Table 10 with estimates in Table 4 we notice that coefficient for individual-level controls tend to be similar. On the other hand, country-level controls are highly statistically significant but show again unstable coefficients in different specifications: the coefficient for *IOP* is positive when the ex-ante measure is used and is negative when the ex-post measure is used.

Moreover, because some of the variables used to explain *IOPP** are also used to partition the EU-SILC dataset in types and calculate *IOP*, it may be safe to verify whether the inclusion and exclusion of this set of variables affect the estimated coefficients. This is verified by identified two set of regressors: A) variables used to define the partition to calculate *IOP* which are observable individual characteristics in ISSP, B) individual characteristics observable in ISSP but not used to measure *IOP*. The set of regressors A includes sex and two variables not included in the model: father occupation (four categories), and number of books at home when the respondent was 15 years old (nine categories). The latter variable is used as proxy for parental education which is not observed in ISSP. The set of regressors B includes all the covariates used to explain *IOPP* but sex: age, marital status, education, employment status, experience of intergenerational mobility, urban/rural residence. Table 12 in the appendix reports the coefficients estimated for three specifications of the multilevel ordered model: controlling for country-level regressors and the set A, controlling for country-level regressors and the set B, and controlling for all regressors. Estimated coefficients are in line with those in Table 4: as far as country-level controls are concerned GDP per capita and its growth seems to be robustly associated with a lower perception of *IOP* (the only exception is the last column of Table 12). Conversely, the statistical association of the objective measure of *IOP* and its perception is again sensitive to the model specification. As far as the individual-level coefficients are concerned additional regressors (not initially included among controls) are significant in explaining *IOPP** only for their lowest category (lowest category in terms of books at home and in terms of father occupation). Most importantly, when both set of regressors are used to explain *IOPP** the sign of individual-level coefficients is unchanged and their significance only slightly modified.

To verify the consistency of our results to different measures of inequality of opportunity we estimate model (5) replacing *IOP* with the inequality of opportunity measure proposed by Checchi et al. (2015) and Brzeziński (2015). Table 10 in the Appendix report the estimates obtained. Recall that the three estimates are only partially comparable because each study considers a slightly different set of countries. Coefficients obtained using Brzeziński (2015) *IOP* are very similar to those in Table 4. The only dif-

ference concerns the statistical significance of the control for the country level variable *IOP* which is no-longer significant. Very similar results are also obtained if the model is specified using *IOP* as estimated by Checchi et al. (2015): all coefficients maintain their sign except the coefficient for *IOP* which becomes and statistically significant.

Finally, Iceland and Portugal are included in the list of countries for which *IOP* and *IOPP* are estimated, but are excluded from the analysis because their surveys do not include information about the area of residence (urban/rural). To check whether their exclusion affects our results we estimate the mixed ordered logit model, not controlling for the area of residence but including Iceland and Portugal; estimates are reported in the last two columns of Table 10 in the Appendix. All the coefficients for individual-level variables maintain their sign and changes in significance are marginal. The association with *IOP* is negative but significant only for ex-post *IOP*.

All the robustness checks we have performed show a rather consistent picture. A number of controls have the same sign and similar level of significance across all specifications. Among the individual controls, experience of social mobility, unemployment, and urban residence have a consistent and clear relationship with perceived inequality of opportunity. The sign of the controls for experience of social mobility is extremely robust, respondents that have experienced upward intergenerational social mobility tend to have a lower level of perceived inequality of opportunity. This is true for all the considered measures of perception and for each one of the observable dimensions of the phenomenon. Among country level controls the picture is less clear: economic growth is negatively correlated with inequality of opportunity perception in the large majority of the model specifications; on the contrary, the association with measures of inequality of opportunity does not have a clear sign.

5 Conclusion

The perception of economic phenomena such as growth, inequality, and discrimination can have a large impact on the beliefs and choices of individuals. Investment choices, electoral behaviour, reproductive decisions may be based on perceived phenomena rather than on objective measurement of them. This explains why perceptions and expectations are recognized as important signals to interpret and predict socioeconomic outcomes, and also explains the popularity of sentiment indicators, such as the European Economic Sentiment Indicator the German IFO Business Climate Index, among policy makers and investors.

However, reality and perception can easily come into conflict. When the Arab Spring spread throughout the majority of Arab countries in 2010, many commentators suggested that protests were triggered by increasing inequality. However, there exists no clear evidence of increasing income inequality in those countries in the preceding years. Nevertheless, perceived inequality have been growing and may be among the causes of one of the most important revolutionary waves of the last decades.

Beliefs and perceptions are often included among explanatory variables in the analysis of individual or collective behaviours. However, perceptions are often considered exogenous variables and the analysis of how they are formed is rarely the focus of these studies.

This paper is the first attempt to empirically explain individual perception of inequality of economic opportunity. There are many possible definitions of equal opportunity, ranging from definitions prescribing that outcomes should be allocated according to talent and merit, to fully egalitarian interpretations of the same principle. However, the vast majority of these definitions distinguish between fair and unfair sources of inequality, and list among the latter circumstances beyond individual control such as race, gender, and socioeconomic background.

We adopted one of the most popular definitions and we estimated two widely used measures of inequality of opportunity in a sample of 23 European countries. For the same countries we construct an individual ordinal measure of perceived unequal opportunities and in merging the two measures, we show a weak correlation between prevailing perceived inequality of opportunity and objective measures of the same phenomenon. A weak correlation is found looking at both the absolute perception and the ranking of countries. Among possible models to explain the individual perception of the phenomenon, we opted for a mixed ordinal logit model. Together with a country random effect, (including two of the three country level explanatory variables), GDP per capita, and economic growth are shown to explain a significant share of the total perception variability. In richer and more dynamic countries, the perceived inequality of opportunity is lower. Conversely, our model suggests that, after controlling for all the other variables, the estimated inequality of opportunity does not play a clear role in determining its perception. Further, we found a number of individual characteristics to have an impact on the degree of perceived inequality of opportunity. Among them, unemployment and experiencing downward intergenerational mobility significantly increase the probability of a person perceiving a lower degree of equal opportunity in her country. We interpret these relationships as signals of the existence of a self-esteem bias in the cognitive process of how people view equality of opportunity: respondents that have good reasons to perceive their experience in the labour market as a failure systematically overemphasise the role of external causes in determining socioeconomic success.

Our results suggest that the popular perception of inequality of opportunity may weakly linked to objective measures of the same phenomenon produced by scholars. Conversely, other country characteristics - such as growth - together with individual experiences play a determining role in shaping our perception of complex phenomena such as inequality of opportunity. These findings suggest an interesting direction for future research: can public perception about inequality of opportunity teach something to economists about how to measure inequality of opportunity? Is it possible to construct an index of relative IOp obtained by aggregating individual perceptions?

Table 5: Individual *IOP* perception: ordered logit marginal effects calculated for model (5)

EX-POST	Lowest IOPp										Highest IOPp									
Education	0.001566	0.000945	0.000720	-0.000940	-0.001690	-0.000280	-0.000245	-0.000019	-0.000040		0.001566	0.000945	0.000720	-0.000940	-0.001690	-0.000280	-0.000245	-0.000019	-0.000040	
Male	-0.009170	-0.005540	-0.004200	0.005550	0.009949	0.001690	0.001437	0.000110	0.000200	***	-0.009170	-0.005540	-0.004200	0.005550	0.009949	0.001690	0.001437	0.000110	0.000200	***
Age	-0.000562	-0.000300	-0.000259	0.000330	0.000600	0.000100	0.000080	0.000000	0.000010	***	-0.000562	-0.000300	-0.000259	0.000330	0.000600	0.000100	0.000080	0.000000	0.000010	***
Married	0.007408	0.004480	0.003510	-0.004400	-0.008074	-0.001380	-0.001160	-0.000094	-0.000100	*	0.007408	0.004480	0.003510	-0.004400	-0.008074	-0.001380	-0.001160	-0.000094	-0.000100	*
Upward mover	0.010010	0.006046	0.004600	-0.006050	-0.010840	-0.001800	-0.001560	-0.000120	-0.000200	***	0.010010	0.006046	0.004600	-0.006050	-0.010840	-0.001800	-0.001560	-0.000120	-0.000200	***
Downward mover	-0.018230	-0.011429	-0.011190	0.011310	0.021670	0.003809	0.003240	0.000260	0.000555	***	-0.018230	-0.011429	-0.011190	0.011310	0.021670	0.003809	0.003240	0.000260	0.000555	***
Unemployed	-0.022000	-0.013950	-0.014500	0.013700	0.026900	0.004770	0.004070	0.000331	0.000690	**	-0.022000	-0.013950	-0.014500	0.013700	0.026900	0.004770	0.004070	0.000331	0.000690	**
Retired	0.010390	0.006190	0.004370	-0.006220	-0.010900	-0.001800	-0.001560	-0.000120	-0.000260		0.010390	0.006190	0.004370	-0.006220	-0.010900	-0.001800	-0.001560	-0.000120	-0.000260	
Worker	0.005960	0.003610	0.002820	-0.003616	-0.006490	-0.001110	-0.000939	-0.000076	-0.000160		0.005960	0.003610	0.002820	-0.003616	-0.006490	-0.001110	-0.000939	-0.000076	-0.000160	
Urban	-0.009800	-0.005900	-0.004840	0.005970	0.010800	0.001860	0.001570	0.000100	0.000269	***	-0.009800	-0.005900	-0.004840	0.005970	0.010800	0.001860	0.001570	0.000100	0.000269	***
IOP	2.116200	1.277500	0.979067	-1.280000	-2.289000	-0.390442	-0.330258	-0.026700	-0.056360	***	2.116200	1.277500	0.979067	-1.280000	-2.289000	-0.390442	-0.330258	-0.026700	-0.056360	***
GDP p.c.	0.000041	0.000020	0.000010	-0.000020	-0.000045	-0.000000	-0.000000	-0.000000	-0.000000		0.000041	0.000020	0.000010	-0.000020	-0.000045	-0.000000	-0.000000	-0.000000	-0.000000	
Growth	0.017700	0.010735	0.008220	-0.010750	-0.019200	-0.003280	-0.002775	-0.000225	-0.000473	***	0.017700	0.010735	0.008220	-0.010750	-0.019200	-0.003280	-0.002775	-0.000225	-0.000473	***
EX-ANTE	Lowest IOPp										Highest IOPp									
Education	0.000514	0.001295	0.000680	-0.001281	-0.000868	-0.000439	-0.000152	-0.000030	-0.000064		0.000514	0.001295	0.000680	-0.001281	-0.000868	-0.000439	-0.000152	-0.000030	-0.000064	
Male	-0.007220	-0.005590	-0.009500	0.005530	0.012210	0.001890	0.002143	0.000131	0.000277	***	-0.007220	-0.005590	-0.009500	0.005530	0.012210	0.001890	0.002143	0.000131	0.000277	***
Age	-0.000420	-0.000314	-0.000560	0.000312	0.000710	0.000107	0.000125	0.000000	0.000016	***	-0.000420	-0.000314	-0.000560	0.000312	0.000710	0.000107	0.000125	0.000000	0.000016	***
Married	0.004940	0.004190	0.006606	-0.004140	-0.008380	-0.001429	-0.001470	-0.000090	-0.000209	*	0.004940	0.004190	0.006606	-0.004140	-0.008380	-0.001429	-0.001470	-0.000090	-0.000209	*
Upward mover	0.008190	0.006240	0.010800	-0.006176	-0.013800	-0.002120	-0.002430	-0.000147	-0.000300	***	0.008190	0.006240	0.010800	-0.006176	-0.013800	-0.002120	-0.002430	-0.000147	-0.000300	***
Downward mover	-0.013200	-0.011240	-0.020250	0.010930	0.024280	0.004174	0.004460	0.000293	0.000617	***	-0.013200	-0.011240	-0.020250	0.010930	0.024280	0.004174	0.004460	0.000293	0.000617	***
Unemployed	-0.015390	-0.012580	-0.024280	0.012173	0.028740	0.004750	0.005350	0.000330	0.000700	**	-0.015390	-0.012580	-0.024280	0.012173	0.028740	0.004750	0.005350	0.000330	0.000700	**
Retired	0.008000	0.006750	0.011020	-0.006710	-0.014400	-0.002220	-0.002480	-0.000154	-0.000320	*	0.008000	0.006750	0.011020	-0.006710	-0.014400	-0.002220	-0.002480	-0.000154	-0.000320	*
Worker	0.004610	0.003645	0.006100	-0.003604	-0.007830	-0.001242	-0.001370	-0.000086	-0.000180		0.004610	0.003645	0.006100	-0.003604	-0.007830	-0.001242	-0.001370	-0.000086	-0.000180	
Urban	-0.007800	-0.006380	-0.010780	0.006290	0.013550	0.002200	0.002400	0.000150	0.000323	***	-0.007800	-0.006380	-0.010780	0.006290	0.013550	0.002200	0.002400	0.000150	0.000323	***
IOP	0.556700	0.535905	0.736000	-0.530430	-0.939840	-0.181449	-0.164600	-0.012591	-0.026500	***	0.556700	0.535905	0.736000	-0.530430	-0.939840	-0.181449	-0.164600	-0.012591	-0.026500	***
GDP p.c.	0.000570	0.000059	0.000750	-0.000058	-0.000960	0.000020	-0.000160	-0.000000	-0.000090		0.000570	0.000059	0.000750	-0.000058	-0.000960	0.000020	-0.000160	-0.000000	-0.000090	
Growth	0.017200	0.010875	0.022820	-0.010764	-0.029120	-0.003682	-0.005100	-0.000250	-0.000538	***	0.017200	0.010875	0.022820	-0.010764	-0.029120	-0.003682	-0.005100	-0.000250	-0.000538	***

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009; EU-SILC, 2011, Eurostat, 2015.

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Appendix

The partition in types to obtain the counterfactual distribution

The measure of inequality of opportunity is obtained partitioning the population into 16 types based on three circumstances: sex, parental education, and parental occupation. Parental occupation is coded into two groups: higher when at least one parent completed upper secondary, and lower otherwise. Parental occupation status is based on the highest ISCO 88 occupation status of the parents, grouped into three categories: highly skilled non-manual (ISCO codes 11-34), lower-skilled non-manual (41-52), skilled manual (61-83) and elementary occupation (91-93).

Table 6: EU-SILC descriptive statistics

country	female	parental education		parental occupation			
		low	high	elementary occupation	skilled manual	lower-skilled non-manual	highly skilled non-manual
BE	0.5006	0.4815	0.5185	0.0128	0.1149	0.1498	0.7225
BG	0.4965	0.4555	0.5445	0.1148	0.3273	0.2435	0.3144
CH	0.5024	0.2799	0.7201	0.0161	0.1262	0.2239	0.6338
CY	0.5213	0.6368	0.3632	0.0378	0.2171	0.1586	0.5866
CZ	0.5632	0.5576	0.4424	0.0278	0.2646	0.3887	0.3189
DE	0.4966	0.1367	0.8633	0.0232	0.1177	0.2582	0.6009
DK	0.5031	0.0858	0.9142	0.0000	0.0924	0.2849	0.6228
EE	0.5269	0.2494	0.7506	0.0241	0.2374	0.2447	0.4937
ES	0.4947	0.8039	0.1961	0.0193	0.0736	0.0914	0.8156
FI	0.4785	0.4420	0.5580	0.1463	0.1553	0.1941	0.5044
FR	0.5148	0.7388	0.2612	0.0507	0.1074	0.2405	0.6014
HU	0.5076	0.5695	0.4305	0.0560	0.2773	0.2791	0.3877
IS	0.5014	0.2753	0.7247	0.0099	0.1508	0.2820	0.5574
IT	0.5027	0.7548	0.2452	0.0198	0.0937	0.1037	0.7829
LT	0.5248	0.4647	0.5353	0.1562	0.2753	0.1899	0.3786
NO	0.4769	0.2326	0.7674	0.0083	0.1067	0.3674	0.5176
PL	0.5070	0.3961	0.6039	0.0254	0.3665	0.2110	0.3970
PT	0.5047	0.9013	0.0987	0.0310	0.2739	0.1391	0.5560
SE	0.4709	0.4298	0.5702	0.0080	0.0727	0.2309	0.6883
SI	0.4975	0.6402	0.3598	0.0613	0.1836	0.2777	0.4773
SK	0.5108	0.3156	0.6844	0.0858	0.2281	0.3554	0.3307
UK	0.5303	0.5346	0.4654	0.0177	0.1103	0.2403	0.6317

Source: Author' calculation based on EU-SILC (2011)

Inequality of opportunity and its perception in 68 European regions

Perceived and measured inequality of opportunity is estimated for 68 European regions. Regions are obtained disaggregating 23 countries when allowed by the sample size and the information contained in EU-SILC and ISSP. Regions are obtained merging information contained in EU-SILC (NUTS-1 and NUTS 2) and in ISSP (where macro-regions are less systematically defined). Table 7 contains the details of the subdivision. Note that given the sample sizes in EU-SILC we calculated only the ex-ante version of inequality of opportunity. Interestingly regions made of largest cities are found to have the highest level of inequality of opportunity with Bruxelles and Prague particularly high in the ranking.

Table 7: Inequality of opportunity in 68 European regions

country	region	sample (EU-SILC)	IOp ex-ante	IOp ex-ante (%)	IOP
AT	Ostosterreich	2,786	0.0052	2.5205	3.68
AT	Sodosterreich	1,309	0.0023	2.4358	1.95
AT	Westosterreich	2,591	0.0035	2.5325	3.00
BE	Bruxelles	824	0.0386	2.4565	16.00
BE	Vlaams Gewest	3,229	0.0045	2.3704	4.18
BG	Severna i yugoiztochna	3,692	0.0188	1.9821	8.84
BG	Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsentralna	3,706	0.0310	2.4291	16.44
CH	Switzerland	7,322	0.0079	2.2551	5.61
CY	Cyprus	5,188	0.0050	2.1085	3.68
CZ	Prague	640	0.0155	2.0896	10.69
CZ	Stredni Cechy	882	0.0064	2.4962	7.07
CZ	Jihozapad	921	0.0067	2.3659	7.54
CZ	Severozapad	765	0.0120	1.8940	9.12
CZ	Severovýchod	972	0.0050	2.4503	4.57
CZ	Jihovýchod	1,242	0.0047	2.4250	4.34
CZ	Stredni Morava	844	0.0119	2.1608	10.64
CZ	Moravskoslezsko	954	0.0056	2.5307	5.15
DE	Deutschland	12,185	0.0027	2.3966	1.89
DK	Denmark	2,784	0.0006	2.1568	0.36
EE	Eesti	5,485	0.0113	2.2706	5.66
ES	Noroeste	2,220	0.0055	2.2311	3.05
ES	Noreste	2,697	0.0065	2.3053	3.76
ES	Comunidad de Madrid	1,544	0.0103	2.3063	5.27
ES	Centro	2,539	0.0088	2.3974	3.83
ES	Este	3,515	0.0067	2.3204	3.87
ES	Sur	2,784	0.0102	2.3102	4.35
ES	Canarias	805	0.0163	1.7941	5.32
FI	Lansi-Suomi	1,363	0.0022	2.0564	2.14
FI	Helsinki-Uusimaa	1,445	0.0032	2.1642	2.84
FI	Etela-Suomi	1,132	0.0008	2.1652	0.79
FI	Pohjois-ja Ita-Suomi	1,219	0.0015	2.1130	1.40
FR	Ile de France	1,737	0.0139	2.2078	8.22
FR	Bassin Parisien	2,071	0.0117	2.1008	8.43
FR	Nord Pas de Calais	902	0.0150	2.2061	11.43
FR	Est	1,235	0.0086	2.0984	4.81
FR	Ouest	1,820	0.0029	2.1213	2.59
FR	Sud-Ouest	1,373	0.0026	2.0843	1.58
FR	Centre-Est	1,224	0.0087	2.1940	5.21
FR	Mediterranee	1,174	0.0068	2.1782	3.94
HU	Central Hungary	3,096	0.0153	2.5976	11.22
HU	Transdanubia	4,091	0.0073	2.3955	6.90
HU	Great Plain and North	7,140	0.0089	2.5862	7.66
IS	Iceland	1,750	0.0015	1.9947	1.31
IT	Nord-Ovest	5,086	0.0059	2.5059	3.61
IT	Sud	4,613	0.0160	2.3042	7.42
IT	Isole	1,900	0.0130	2.3650	5.27
IT	Nord-Est	5,187	0.0046	2.6128	3.23
IT	Centro	5,290	0.0081	2.3631	4.76
LT	Lietuva	5,384	0.0075	2.1590	3.47
NO	Norway	2,752	0.0013	2.1628	1.38
PL	Centralny	3,252	0.0177	2.2280	8.90
PL	Poludniowy	2,967	0.0070	2.3271	3.78
PL	Wschodni	3,276	0.0136	2.1678	8.41
PL	Polnocno-zachodni	2,287	0.0090	2.2838	5.93
PL	Poludniowo-zachodni	1,474	0.0081	2.2866	4.54
PL	Polnocny	2,350	0.0122	2.3400	7.30
PT	Portugal	6,331	0.0159	2.2600	8.03
SE	East Sweden	411	0.0019	2.1463	1.62
SE	South Sweden	494	0.0014	2.1754	1.31
SE	North Sweden	238	0.0036	2.1608	4.34
SI	Slovenija	5,243	0.0048	2.2931	4.67
SK	Slovensko	7,562	0.0044	2.3780	3.31
UK	Nort-East and Yorkshire	1,765	0.0087	2.1240	5.76
UK	East-Midlands	1,092	0.0090	2.1727	6.66
UK	East of England	2,095	0.0082	2.0307	4.03
UK	London	659	0.0183	2.2427	7.81
UK	Wales	364	0.0104	2.0833	5.85
UK	Scotland	623	0.0108	2.0104	6.14

Descriptive statistics are calculated using sample weights where available.

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009 & EU-SILC, 2011

Other inequality of opportunity measures

IOP is only one possible measure of inequality of opportunity. Other two published papers have estimated inequality of opportunity in Europe exploiting the EU-SILC 2011 dataset. Table 8 show our measures together with estimations produced by Brzeziński (2015) and Checchi et al. (2014). In the former study inequality of opportunity is estimated as inequality between types, that is the reward-consistent approach. parametrically including among circumstances: parental education, parental occupation, citizenship. Checchi et al. (2015) add to those circumstances gender and adopt a non-parametric approach. The measure of inequality in the counterfactual distribution they use is the Gini coefficient instead of the mean logarithmic deviation. There is a large overlapping in the sets of countries considered with few exceptions.

Table 8: Existing IOpP estimates based on EU-SILC 2011

country	s IOp	Checchi et al., 2015	Brzeziński, 2015
AT	0.0034	0.1540	0.0114
BE	0.0076	0.1340	0.0204
BG	0.0330	0.1320	0.0482
CH	0.0058	0.2180	
CY	0.0061		
CZ	0.0072	0.1230	0.0115
DE	0.0031	0.1800	0.0040
DK	0.0008	0.0730	0.0036
EE	0.0077	0.1290	0.0225
ES	0.0097	0.1240	0.0237
FI	0.0017	0.0960	0.0022
FR	0.0071	0.1290	0.0100
HU	0.0157	0.1330	0.0207
IS	0.0014		
IT	0.0112	0.1430	0.0181
LT	0.0056	0.0920	0.0183
NO	0.0017	0.1120	0.0039
PL	0.0099	0.1420	0.0198
PT	0.0188	0.1000	0.0152
SE	0.0027	0.0920	0.0017
SI	0.0060	0.0860	0.0082
SK	0.0047		0.0092
UK	0.0079	0.1650	0.0079

Source: Checchi et al. (2015), Brzeziński (2015).

Perception components

Table 9 shows the correlation between the eight dimensions of inequality of opportunity perception (answers are coded in a scale from 1 to 5).

Table 9: Answers correlation across *IOP* components

	Fam. wealth	Edu. parent	Network	Race	Religion	Gender	University	Ambition	Hard work
Fam. wealth	1								
Edu. parent	0.4919***	1							
Network	0.3771***	0.2391***	1						
Race	0.2722***	0.1814***	0.2234 ***	1					
Religion	0.1878***	0.1561 ***	0.1568***	0.5066 ***	1				
Gender	0.2624***	0.1652***	0.2174***	0.4751***	0.4149 ***	1			
University	0.0993***	0.0651***	0.0375***	0.0963***	0.0307***	0.0863***	1		
Ambition	-0.1341 ***	-0.1205***	-0.2186***	-0.0657 ***	-0.0088	-0.0755***	0.0606***	1	
Hard work	-0.0436 ***	-0.0685***	-0.1246***	-0.0017	0.0057	-0.0082	0.0801 ***	0.4247***	1

† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009.

Robustness check

Table 10: Alternative model specifications

	<i>IOP</i> (sum of components)		<i>IOP</i> * (effort excluded)		<i>IOP</i> Brzeziński (2015)	<i>IOP</i> Checchi et al (2015)	No urban/rural	
	<i>IOP</i> ex-post	<i>IOP</i> ex-ante	<i>IOP</i> ex-post	<i>IOP</i> ex-ante			<i>IOP</i> ex-post	<i>IOP</i> ex-ante
Education	-0.1331 **	-0.1331 **	0.0385	0.0466 *	-0.0143	0.0159	0.0071	0.0054
Male	0.2515 ***	0.2515 ***	0.0965 ***	0.0906 ***	0.1149 ***	0.0830 ***	0.0814 ***	0.0829 ***
Age	0.0100 ***	0.0100 ***	0.0043 ***	0.0043 ***	0.0052 ***	0.0067 ***	0.0068 ***	0.0066 ***
Married	-0.2847 ***	-0.2849 ***	-0.0738 ***	-0.0740 ***	-0.0611 **	-0.0644 **	-0.0698 ***	-0.0764 ***
Upward mover	-0.1803 ***	-0.1803 ***	-0.0749 ***	-0.0660 **	-0.1092 ***	-0.0912 ***	0.0068 ***	-0.0957 ***
Downward mover	0.3815 ***	0.3816 ***	0.1688 ***	0.1700 ***	0.2087 ***	0.1816 ***	0.1737 ***	0.1706 ***
Unemployed	0.5949 ***	0.5946 ***	0.1530 **	0.1692 **	0.1522 *	0.1649 **	0.2392 ***	0.2136 ***
Retired	-0.3552 ***	-0.3554 ***	-0.0963 *	-0.0645	-0.1502	-0.1600 **	-0.1046 *	-0.1482
Worker	-0.1777	-0.1778	-0.0837 *	-0.0753	-0.0856	-0.0738	-0.0410	-0.0719
Urban	0.2992 ***	0.2992 ***	0.1213 **	0.0903 ***	0.0682 **	0.0841 ***	.	.
<i>IOP</i>	-15.0529	-12.6990	-14.0312 ***	21.3059 ***	-1.6422	2.9729 ***	-11.2700 ***	-2.2297
GDP p.c.	-0.0348 **	-0.0337 **	-0.0231 ***	-0.0035 ***	-0.0056 ***	-0.0056 ***	-0.0070 ***	-0.0062 ***
Growth	-0.6294 *	-0.6107 *	-0.4949 ***	0.2890 ***	-0.1920 ***	-0.2367 ***	-0.3140 ***	-0.1441 ***

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009 and EU-SILC, 2011.

Table 11: Coefficients for *IOpP* components

	Family wealth	Gender	Connections	Race	Religion	University	Hard work	Ambition
Education	0.0745 *	0.1068 ***	-0.1252 ***	0.0342	-0.0900 *	-0.0525 *	-0.0436	-0.0814 ***
Male	0.2587 ***	-0.2012 ***	0.2656 ***	0.1326 ***	-0.0131	0.0540 **	0.0440	-0.0522 *
Age	0.0021 *	0.0047 ***	-0.0054 ***	0.0030 **	0.0042	0.0010	0.0020	-0.0158 ***
Married	-0.0358	-0.0620 **	-0.0643 **	-0.0287	-0.0351	-0.1140 ***	-0.0357	-0.0158
Upward mover	-0.1066 ***	0.0199	0.0402	-0.0535 *	-0.0569 *	-0.0859 ***	-0.1039 ***	-0.1464 ***
Downward mover	0.2146 ***	0.1519 ***	0.2116 ***	0.0909	0.0511	0.0363	-0.0043	-0.1535 ***
Unemployed	0.2079 ***	0.0510	0.1811 **	0.1680 **	0.0301	0.1014	0.0496	0.1525 **
Retired	-0.0539	-0.1031 *	-0.1687 ***	-0.0808	0.0254	-0.0768	-0.2169 ***	-0.0097
Worker	-0.0559	-0.0179	-0.1420 ***	-0.0343	-0.0963	0.0335	-0.0718	0.0166
Urban	0.1664 ***	0.0931 ***	0.0258	0.1620 ***	0.0535 *	0.0547 *	0.0138	-0.0312
IOp (ex-post)	22.7643 ***	-1.8810	5.3553 **	10.9620 ***	-12.1825 ***	-18.7490 ***	-32.3935 ***	-59.0553 ***
GDP p.c.	-0.0255 ***	-0.0061 ***	-0.0171 ***	0.0040 ***	0.0008	-0.0183 ***	-0.0035 **	-0.0002
Growth	-0.0091	-0.0633 **	-0.0281	-0.1000 ***	0.1014 ***	-0.5209 ***	-0.4017 ***	0.2447 ***

Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009 and EU-SILC, 2011.

Table 12: Determinants of $IOPP^*$: including and excluding variables used to measure IOP

		A		B		A+B	
		Ex-post IOp	Ex-ante IOp	Ex-post IOp	Ex-ante IOp	Ex-post IOp	Ex-ante IOp
Sex	Male	0.0434 *	0.0445 *			0.0615 **	0.0641 **
Father occupation	Highly skilled non-manual	0.1289 ***	0.1254 ***			0.1211 **	0.1072 *
	Lower-skilled non-manual	0.0337	0.0296			0.0587	0.0470
	Skilled manual	0.0229	0.0223			0.0362	0.0306
Number of books	None	0.2633 ***	0.2596 ***			0.2253 **	0.2305 **
	1 or 2	0.0859	0.0840			0.0191	0.0266
	Around 10	0.0886	0.0886			0.0237	0.0481
	Around 20	0.0951	0.0985			0.0780	0.1046
	Around 50	-0.0630	-0.0600			-0.0810	-0.0626
	Around 100	-0.0689	-0.0650			-0.0877	-0.0669
	Around 200	-0.0806	-0.0785			-0.1037	-0.0871
	Around 500	-0.1092	-0.1076			-0.1334	-0.1185
	Education			-0.0237	-0.0010	0.0405	0.0303
	Age			0.0055 **	0.0057 **	0.0053	0.0047 ***
	Married			-0.0594 ***	-0.0560 ***	-0.0354	-0.0430
	Upward mover			-0.0584 **	-0.0681 **	-0.0686 **	-0.0801 ***
	Downward mover			0.1330 ***	0.1267 ***	0.1151 ***	0.1075 **
	Unemployed			0.3201 ***	0.3104 ***	0.2377 ***	0.2110 ***
	Retired			-0.0346	-0.0058	-0.0457	-0.0468
	Worker			0.0350 ***	0.0416	-0.0010	-0.0067
	Urban			0.1212 ***	0.1180 ***	0.1426 ***	0.1558 ***
Country-level variables	IOP	18.2184 ***	10.9100 ***	-31.4620 ***	-10.6600 ***	-0.0474	-93.1770
	GDP p.c.	-0.0000	-0.0000 ***	0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000 ***	-0.0000
	Growth	-0.2754 ***	-0.1510 ***	-0.8029 ***	-0.3114 ***	-0.2988 ***	0.3277 ***

Variables A are the variables used to measure IOP , variables B are individual characteristics that explain $IOPP$ but are not used to measure IOP . Source: Author' calculation based on ISSP, 2009 and EU-SILC, 2011.